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Abstract: 
Emprical studies of hyperinflations reveal that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to hold.  To 
address this issue, we study a model of hyperinflation and learning in an attempt to better understand the 
volatility in movements of expectations, money, and prices.  The findings surprisingly imply that the 
dynamics under neural network learning appear to support the outcome achieved under least squares 
learning reported in the earlier literature.  Relaxing the assumption that inflationary expectations are 
rational, however, is essential since it improves the fit of the model to actual data from episodes of severe 
hyperinflation.  Simulations provide ample evidence that if equilibrium in the model exists, then the 
inflation rate converges to the low inflation rational expectations equilibrium.  This suggests a classical 
result: a permanent increase in the government deficit raises the stationary inflation rate (Marcet and 
Sargent, 1989). 
 
JEL classification: C62 E63 E65 
Key Words: Hyperinflation, Learning, Rational Expectations Equlibria, Neural Networks 1. The Main Questions 
  In the United States and Western Europe, it is generally accepted that new money 
creation (seigniorage) is not typically resorted to as a source of public finance (Plosser 
and King, 1985).  This is in stark contrast with the recent experience in some East 
European and Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries (Miller and Zhang, 1997).  With the 
collapse of the command system and with the deterioration of the balance sheets in state-
owned enterprises, governments were forced to seek new sources of revenue.  Reform 
delays in most countries and slow progress toward privatization in some countries created 
further obstacles to improvement in the fiscal position of governments.  In periods of 
such upheaval, the absence of strong independence of the central bank meant that weak 
governments could easily resort to extensive money creation.  The results have been very 
high and variable rates of inflation, especially in the initial stages of transition.  In some 
instances, hyperinflation has occurred.  Such episodes are the subject of this paper. 
  Hyperinflations are economic anomalies in the sense that variations in nominal 
and monetary variables almost completely outweigh variations in real variables (Cagan, 
1956, p. 25).  Thus, such episodes provide opportunities for testing of long-standing 
hypotheses in monetary theory, especially regarding the linkage between money and 
prices.  They thus also provide natural laboratories for studying inflationary expectations 
and policy regime changes.  The economic theory of hyperinflation was stimulated by the 
observations of the dramatic historical episodes witnessed over the past century.
1  There 
is little disagreement that movements in expected inflation account principally for the 
                                                 
1 These include the classic hyperinflations of the interwar period: Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and 
Russia. Other examples involve Hungary and China during and after WWII; some Latin American 
countries in the 1980s, viz., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru; Israel in the mid-1980s; and most recently 
Yugoslavia, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Bulgaria. 
 
1changes in demand for money during hyperinflations.  However, the process of 
stabilizing inflation is more controversial.  A traditional view holds that stopping 
inflation necessarily requires that money creation be severely restrained.  The classic 
essay by Cagan (1956) elaborates on this point of view.
2  Sargent (1993, p. 45) extends 
these earlier ideas to include the need for a credible fiscal restraint that becomes 
“sufficiently binding to be widely believed.”
3  His main message implies that 
hyperinflations end only when accompanied by sudden, credible policy change by the 
government.  When the government is unable to finance the deficit through means other 
than money creation, high seigniorage is exacted and inflation soars.  Notwithstanding 
these contributions, the enduring questions remain: what causes hyperinflations; what 
stops them; are expectations rational during episodes of dramatic increases in money and 
prices, and during regime shifts; can agents in hyperinflationary environments “learn to 
stabilize?” 
We use a standard overlapping generations model with money in which the deficit 
is financed through seigniorage to study some of these questions.  Much like Cagan’s 
findings (1956), the model results in two equilibria with stationary inflation levels (high 
and low).  We next introduce two alternative learning mechanisms to explain better the 
stylized facts of economies during hyperinflation.  This work follows, among others, 
                                                 
2 Also of note is Bresciani-Turroni (1937, p. 355), who calls stabilization a “miraculous event,” observing 
“The stabilisation of the German exchange showed, as did that of the Austrian crown, this characteristic: 
The exchange was stabilized before there existed conditions (above all the equilibrium of the Reich 
Budget) which alone could assure a lasting recovery of the monetary situation.” Keynes’ eloquent A Tract 
on Monetary Reform (1923. p. 40 and 47), which in effect pre-dates actual stabilizations of the time, makes 
a subtler point: “Has the public in the last resort no remedy, no means of protecting itself against these 
ingenious depredations? It has only one remedy—to change its habits in the use of money. The initial 
assumption on which our argument rested was that the community did not change its habits in the use of 
money.  ….. a minimum is reached eventually from which the least favorable circumstance will cause a 
sharp recovery.” 
3 Sargent’s original essay was published in 1982. 
 
2Sargent and Wallace (1987), Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003).  
It captures two main ideas: the workings of a credible regime shift that is typically 
required to end a hyperinflation, and the study of the dynamics of adjustment under 
learning and allowing for a small departure from rational expectations (to be precisely 
defined below).  We employ the internal consistency (IC) equilibrium requirement in 
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) to compare and numerically contrast our results.  We show 
that, under both least squares and neural network learning, the large size of fiscal shocks 
and higher levels of average seiniorage in early transition economies account for the 




  There is widespread agreement that inflationary expectations play a central role in 
hyperinflations.  What is still little understood is how these expectations are formed.  
Since Cagan’s pioneering work, Sargent and Wallace (1973), Sargent (1977) and Sargent 
and Salemi (1979) have formulated the model under rational expectations to explain 
governments’ reliance on deficit finance through money creation observed in most 
hyperinflations.  This result points to the presence of a feedback from inflation to future 
rates of money creation, i.e., inflation Granger-causes money creation.  In at least several 
of the hyperinflations that Cagan studied, empirical results in Sargent and Wallace (1973, 
p. 418-419) provide evidence that inflation influences subsequent rates of money growth.  
This link is stronger than the weaker effects going in the other direction.  Thus, money 
creation is endogenous, governed by the need to finance fiscal deficits.   
 
3This happens, Sargent (1977, p. 431) claims, because the system during 
hyperinflation operates under a particular money supply rule which predetermines the 
outcome.  If, however, the monetary regime changes, so will the causality in the money 
creation-inflation process.  Furthermore, Sargent (1977) explains, due to this simultaneity 
bias in Cagan’s estimator, a “paradox” emerges which may easily be resolved: the actual 
rates of inflation in these hyperinflationary episodes far exceeded the rates that would 
yield the maximum sustainable revenue from money creation available to governments.
4 
To address this and other regularities exhibited in the data, such as the tendency 
for the real balances to sharply decline while inflation soars, Sargent and Wallace (1981, 
1987) use a Cagan-type, portfolio equation for the demand for real money balances 
together with a government budget constraint relating seigniorage and money creation.  
Under rational expectations (RE), they show that the model exhibits a continuum of 
equilibria converging to two stationary rational expectations ones.  The model implies 
that the economy may end up on “the slippery side of the Laffer Curve.”  These dual 
equilibria, studied also in Bruno and Fisher (1990), Benthal and Eckstein (1990) and Lee 
and Ratti (1993) though under a slightly different (continuous-time) set-up, suggest that 
the same amount of seigniorage (the revenue from money creation) may be extracted at 
either the high “inflation trap” or the lower rate of inflation consistent with RE.  Bruno 
and Fisher (1990, p. 353 and 373) conclude that this may be the direct result of the 
operation rules (regime) the government selects for its monetary and fiscal policy.  How 
and which equilibrium path is to be selected remains an open question.  However, 
Sargent and Wallace (1987) also provide little explanation of the way in which agents 
                                                 
4 Companion empirical work shows this to be the case in several East European hyperinflations.  See also 
Salemi and Sargent (1979). 
 
4come to acquire RE and knowledge about the economy experiencing hyperinflation 
(Fischer, 1987).  The model with rational expectations cannot account for rapid and 
increasing rates of inflation that end with a sudden “restoration of normality.” 
Laboratory evidence and a survey of expectations (in the case of the Bulgarian 
hyperinflation) also suggest that significant adjustment of expectations occurred only in 
the period immediately preceding policy change (Marimon and Sunder (1993), Carlson 
and Valev (2001)).  Burdekin and Whited (2001, p. 78), however, point to some 
differences in this regard in stabilizing Taiwanese hyperinflation (1945-1953).  The 
reform package of 1949 had little influence on the public’s future expectations of 
inflation, and stabilization occurred only gradually and only in the presence of multiple 
regime shifts. 
Marcet and Sargent (1989c) present a model of learning and hyperinflation, in 
which either the economy converges to the low inflation steady state or no equilibrium 
exists under least squares learning.
5  However, the result is classical in the sense that a 
higher deficit is associated with a higher, stable stationary inflation rate.  Under RE, an 
increase in deficits results in a lower stationary inflation rate.  These results appear to be 
not completely satisfactory, and as Bullard (1994) demonstrates, under an alternative 
preference map, least squares learning converges to a periodic equilibrium.  Agents are 
also not allowed to re-specify their perceived law of motion of the system in response to 
any structural breaks, or regime shifts.   
                                                 
5  By least squares learning, in this context, we mean an adaptive learning rule, which is a mapping of past 
inflation observations into future forecasts whereby agents rely on misspecified economic models and 
“run” least squares regressions that converge asymptotically to the actual ones.  See Marcet and Sargent 
(1989a,b).  For earlier insight and analysis, see DeCanio (1979), Bray (1982), and Bray and Savin (1986).  
For convergence, these authors rely on methods different than the ones presented in the above papers 
(Ljung’s ordinary differential equation method).  See also Woodford (1990) for exposition of Ljung’s 
(1977) main theorems.  Margaritis (1987) is the first application of Ljung’s results in economics. 
 
5Arifovic (1995) and Bullard and Duffy (1998) study the model under genetic 
algorithms, interpreting it as a model of learning and emulation in which heterogeneous 
agents interact and evolve to understand how to forecast the future.  The results in their 
artificial economies indicate that the lower of the two is a stationary equilibrium, while at 
the same time a self-fulfilling hyperinflation may be reached and sustained.  Duffy and 
Bullard (1998) also show non-convergence to any of the equilibria. 
Adaptive learning of expectations addresses a number of issues raised by the 
above inconsistencies in modeling expectations and hyperinflation episodes in particular.  
One set of questions involves the examination of transitional dynamics in equilibrium 
selection, where the experience gained from transition economies is particularly useful to 
motivate its application.  Following some type of structural change or policy regime shift, 
economies necessarily grope for ways to reach RE.  Some RE are learnable while others 
are not, as summarized in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Arifovic and Bullard 
(2001). 
This paper uses a model developed by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) to test, via 
simulations, the stability and the empirical validity of the model in a hyperinflationary 
environment.  It also examines the behavior of the model under two alternative learning 
rules and addresses the stylized facts of recent hyperinflation experiences.
6  We reflect, in 
general, on the convergence of learning processes based on neural networks for which no 
analytical results are yet available.
7  It is of considerable interest to understand whether 
the stability conditions for this particular self-referential model are the same under 
                                                 
6 In the same spirit, though different in approach, Sargent (1999) and Lansing (2001) provide some 
explanation for the “Great Inflation” in the US. 
7 See White, (1989, p. 1003): “…investigations of network learning methods have so far proceeded by 
Monte Carlo simulation; a rigorous and general analysis of network learning has not yet been carried out.” 
 
6alternative (reasonable) econometric learning rules.  Are these (in)stability conditions the 
same as the frequently encountered “expectational stability” or E-stability conditions?  If 
not, why not, and does this vindicate the model if it can explain stylized facts in 
hyperinflations?  Section 3 discusses the stylized facts.  Section 4 finds motivation in the 
existing literature on learning and hyperinflation and addresses some of its deficiencies.  
Neural networks and learning are the subject of Section 5.  Section 6 describes the model.  
Learning is introduced, motivated and defined in Section 7.  Section 8 studies the model 
under neural network learning.  Simulations and results are presented in Section 9. 
 
3. Hyperinflations: The Stylized Facts and Stabilizations 
Table 1 reports selected hyperinflations over the last century.  It is evident that the 
hyperinflation phenomenon is relatively short in duration and characterized by highly 
unstable and explosive paths of inflation and money growth (Bruno, 1991).  In most 
instances, there was a complete collapse of the currency and the monetary system.  Most 
of those hyperinflations are well documented.  The important common feature that 
emerges is the fiscal difficulties that accompanied each episode.  In some sense, 
hyperinflations have been largely fiscal in origin.  The way these economies regained 
stability was only after a credible and abrupt change in fiscal and monetary regimes.  This 
attests to the importance of inflationary expectations in successful stabilizations.  It is 
only after a drastic revision of the public’s expectations of future government policies 
that inflation is promptly curtailed (Sargent, 1993).  In Germany, inflation was finally 
brought down suddenly after the implementation of a new fiscal regime in November 
 
71923.
8  Bolivia managed to end its hyperinflation by unifying and stabilizing the 
exchange rate while at the same committing to adjusting the fundamental fiscal 
imbalances in the economy (Sachs, 1987). 
It is well established in the literature that these types of stabilizations work 
successfully through influencing inflationary expectations in such a way that the public 
understands the reform packages carried out by governments (transparency) and 
anticipates that the announced policies will be pursued (credibility).  This is achieved 
through a combination of “orthodox” and “heterodox” policy.  Stabilizations that occur 
through incomes policies are called heterodox, and those that do not orthodox.  Orthodox 
policies aim to reduce the deficit permanently through both monetary and fiscal reforms.  
In addition, those programs that stabilize inflation using the exchange rate as the nominal 
anchor for the economy are exchange–rate based stabilizations.
9  I n  money-based 
stabilizations, the central bank targets the money stock.  Table 2 summarizes some recent 
stabilization experiences.  With the exception of Brazil, the hyperinflations of Table 1 all 
ended with the implementation of some type of an orthodox program.  Thus, in what 
follows, we model this feature explicitly to discuss the end of hyperinflations and the role 
of learning. 
  Figures 1 and 2 exhibit the quarterly, and where available the monthly, inflation 
rate and seigniorage as a percent of GDP for each of the hyperinflations we use to 
                                                 
8  Vegh (1992) describes the experiences of effectively stopping hyperinflations in 1920s Europe and 1980s 
Latin America.  His evidence suggests that the exchange rate served as the nominal anchor, and 
hyperinflations were stopped “almost overnight” without significant loss in output. Webb (1986) also 
asserts that inflationary expectations were driven in an important way during the German hyperinflation by 
fiscal news, i.e., the steady increase and anticipation of budget deficits. 
9  For more on the implications of money-based and exchange rate-based stabilization, see Bofinger (1996). 
He examines the experience of three former Soviet Union countries.  In addition, see also Dornbusch et. al. 
(1990) and Bruno (1991). 
 
8motivate this study.  For these countries, the data show that seigniorage rises as the 
deficit increases and inflation remains high.
10  Notice also that the levels of seigniorage 
that lead to hyperinflation in all cases are similar to those that occur at much lower rates 
of inflation.  In other words, bursts of explosive inflation occurred in periods in which 
seigniorage was low and even declined.  For example, in Ukraine, a five percent 
seigniorage level corresponds to both the highest rate of inflation in the fourth quarter of 
1993 and the lower inflation rate of the first quarter of 1995.  This suggests that a low 
contemporaneous relationship exists between these two variables in hyperinflations.  Not 
reported here, the cross correlograms of these two series reveal a well-defined spike in 
the third and fourth lags and then descrease to zero.
11  The cross correlations are positive 
since an increase in seigniorage produces a subsequent rise in inflation.  It also appears 
that seigniorage leads the periods of accelerating inflation. 
  Finally, following Marcet and Nicolini (2003), we may detail the stylized facts of 
hyperinflations in the following way (and as our examination of recent hyperinflations in 
the 1990s reveals): 
1.  Hyperinflations occur in countries with high, on average, levels of 
seigniorage. 
2.  There exists a low contemporaneous correlation between seigniorage and 
inflation, for a given hyperinflation country. 
                                                 
10 See also Fischer, et. al. (2002).  In addition, we estimate the following non-linear relationship to establish 
this in our case: 
2
01 2 *inf *inf seigniorage lation l ββ β ε =+ + + .  Controlling for fixed effects for each 
country, we find  1 β  to be positive and significant and  2 β  negative and significant but of smaller 
magnitude.  This may indicate the presence of a Laffer curve effect. 




























93.  A  credible regime shift (an exchange rate rule) stops hyperinflations 
successfully. 
These stylized facts appear to be uncontroversial in the literature; see Bruno (1991, 
1993), Dornbusch, Sturzenegger, and Wolf (1990) and Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh (2002). 
 
4. Why Learning Hyperinflations? 
  Hyperinflationary episodes are usually accompanied by a sharp fall in real 
balances and chaotic behavior of money growth and prices.  Cagan (1956) attempted to 
isolate a stable money demand function even in these extreme circumstances.  In periods 
of such short but drastic changes and upheaval, he explained that demand for real 
balances is not a function of income or the real interest rate but rather, more generally, of 
the rate of return on holding money.  The opportunity cost of holding money is the rate of 
inflation, as even anecdotal evidence suggests.  However, what matters is the rate of 
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Cagan also postulated that adjustment occurred as a fraction of the forecast error of the 
previous period.  His adaptive expectations formula is as follows: 
    (2)  1 ()
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10β is the speed of adjustment.  As discussed earlier, there are a number of problems with 
this approach.
12  Furthermore, Cagan (1956, p. 77) points out that sudden shifts in 
expectations will not occur if expected future inflation is determined only by past events. 
  These concerns were first addressed in Sargent and Wallace (1973) who 
formulated the model with rational expectations and followed by a series of articles by 
Sargent and others.  The issues that were mainly addressed concern the inertia evident in 
Cagan’s adaptive expectations and the sudden and abrupt stabilization that accompany 
most hyperinflations.  This point was fully developed in Sargent’s “The End of Four Big 
Inflations” (1982).  In addition, it appeared that the estimates of alpha in Equation (1) did 
not accord well with the actual average inflation rates experienced.  Governments inflated 
too fast to maximize revenue through seigniorage.  There is some empirical evidence to 
this effect, especially in recent transition countries’ experience. 
  Sargent and Wallace (1981 and 1987) formulated a model with a Cagan-type 
money demand with rational expectations in which they specified explicitly the 
endogeneity of the money creation process, motivated by the need to finance a given 
level of seigniorage.  They discover (confirm) a duality of rational expectations 
equilibria, with high inflation stationary equilibrium being the stable solution and the 
attractor of a continuum of equilbria.  Given the stylized facts of hyperinflations, this is 
not completely satisfactory.  In some sense, it even implies that the economy may end up 
in high inflation equilibria indefinitely.  In addition, raising the level of seigniorage, 
                                                 
12 Cagan (1956, 72) also notes this deficiency eloquently: “…In the light of the sharp rise in the balances 
when a reform of the currency approaches, any diminution in the rate at which notes were issued would 
likely alter the prevailing expectation of a certain future inflation to one of a less rapid rate, whether the 
reaction index were greater than unity or not. If so, the balances would rise at once if the policies of the 
note-issuing authorities justified more confidence in the future value of the currency. These sudden 
revisions in expectations cannot be accounted for in a model that predicts future prices on the basis of past 
changes in prices and money alone.” 
 
11reduces inflation.  This, however, is counterintuitive and does not also accord with actual 
observations.  This is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 of Appendix 3 in the paper. 
  Marcet and Sargent (1989b) analyze least squares learning in the context of this 
model.  They find that the model either converges to the low inflation equilibrium, which 
is Pareto superior, or no equilibrium exists, for high enough seigniorage.  This result is 
classical in the sense that higher deficits financed through seigniorage obtain stable 
stationary inflation rate.  These findings are the basis of the dynamics of the model 
developed by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and the one we study under two alternative 
learning procedures in the rest of the paper. 
  As described in Marcet and Sargent (1988, 1989a), adaptive learning arises in the 
following manner: agents stipulate a mapping of the equilibrium dynamics of the state 
variable in the model economy; then they estimate an econometric model that fits this 
relationship.  This econometric model describes the agent’s perceived law of motion 
(PLM).  Agents thus use these estimates to evaluate forecasts of future values of state 
variables.  In other words, “agents act like econometricians.”  These forecasts are then 
used in the model to obtain solutions for the actual path of the variables of interest.  This 
is the agent’s actual law of motion (ALM).  This process is updated each period and 
repeated recursively as more data become available.  The main interest in the analysis is 
the conditions under which PLM converges to the ALM and the choice of the updating 
(decision) rule that governs the agents’ behavior.  Evans and Honkapohja (2001) discuss 
the notion of expectational stability (E-stability) that defines the convergence of learning 
dynamics to rational expectations equilibria.  In other words, the conditions for the 
asymptotic stability of the rational expectations equilibrium under least squares learning, 
 
12for example, are described by the mapping from PLM to ALM.
13  In this instance, for the 
model adopted below, Marcet and Nicolini (2003) describe the stability properties of the 
mapping T. 
  Marcet and Nicolini’s (2003) work also suggests that rational expectations and 
adaptive learning may be seen as non-competing approaches.  If rational expectations 
obtain, then those may still be learnable in the long run.  Thus the adaptive learning 
approach to expectations formation allows us to explore the learnability and stability of 
steady state solutions in the seigniorage model (Evans and Hokapohja, 2001 and Lettau 
and Van Zandt, 2002).  Recent contributions are Barucci (2001) and Heinemann (2000).  
Bullard and Butler (1993), discussing policy implications of these types of models, 
declare: “A learning hypothesis is attractive, since it is not clear that perfect foresight is 
even a feasible assumption when equilibrium dynamics become complicated or chaotic, 
because then agents in the model predict perfectly even when observers outside the 
model see only white noise.  These issues remain open.  When deviations from baseline 
assumptions are incorporated, stabilization policy can be both desirable and efficacious.  
This is therefore an important avenue for future research.” (p. 866) 
 
5. Hidden layer neural networks and learning 
  Neural networks are a class of nonlinear models developed by cognitive scientists 
to mimic the architecture of the human brain.  Implicitly, they are designed to ‘learn’ the 
                                                 
13 Assume a mapping  () T φ φ → , from PLM to ALM.  Assume the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) 
is a fixed point of T, i.e., 
* () T
* φ φ =  under some regularity conditions.  Then a given REE is said to be E-







= −  is locally asymptotically stable at 
* φ  (see also Evans and 
Honkapohja, 2001, p. 140). 
 
13model parameters through a complex interaction with their ‘environment’ (patterns of 
weights and connections) in a process that can be viewed as a recursive estimation 
procedure (the method of back-propagation).  In this way, these networks discover an 
unknown functional relationship between inputs and outputs.  They represent an input-
output system in which a mapping of inputs x1, …, xp into outputs y1, …, yn occurs.  For 
our purposes, they express functional forms that are approximating unknown 
relationships among relevant variables.  The single hidden-layer feedforward network has 
the following form: 
00
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== ∑∑     (3) 
We can view Equation (3) as a nonlinear function, in which only one layer of hidden 
units exists; the model is “feedforward” because signals flow in only one direction, more 
complicated networks may have both more hidden units and allow for certain 
“feedbacks” as well.    is the activation function, usually of sigmoid shape;  a β  and λ  
are the unknown weights. 
The usefulness of this functional form is its ability to approximate a set of 
mappings from input to output spaces as indicated by Hornik, Stinchcombe and White 
(1989) and White (1989).  The theorem is formally stated in Judd (1998, p. 246).   
However, performance is sensitive to specification and one should be careful in applying 
these models to specific empirical phenomenon involving inputs and outputs.  In this 
sense, NN coefficients are chosen to minimize the distance between the target and the 
output match.  Determination of those coefficients is done through stochastic 
 
14approximation methods that model a dynamic process of learning and updating (Judd, 
1998). 
The recursive learning procedure that is used in solving the minimization problem 
is called back-propagation, and is implemented through a local gradient descent (see 
Kosko, 1992 and White, 1989 for details).  It is expressed in the following way: 
11 1 ( , )( ( , )) 1,2... tt t tt t t fx y fx f o r t θθ η θ θ −− − =+ ∇− ∀ =     (4) 
The back propagation starts with initial random weights θ  and updates occur through (4).  
These values are a function of the β s and λ s in (3).    is the learning rate, and the 
gradient with respect to the weights is  .  The weights continue to adjust in response to 
the errors of reaching the target output, yt.  The error, in this sense, is propagated back.  If 
neural network training is done “on-line” as a recursive scheme, it closely resembles 
adaptive learning as discussed above.  It simply represents an alternative statistical 
learning rule.  η can be either decreasing to accommodate the effects of shocks that die 
out in the approximation or it can be a constant where it is appropriate for learning in 
evolving systems and tracking is necessary for abrupt changes (White, 1990).  In this 
sense, the learning rate controls the influences innovations have on updating the current 
estimate.  We attempt to exploit this feature of the learning algorithm below, where 
vanishing learning rates may fail to recognize a sudden shift in the system and we resort 
to some optimal fixed learning rates to track evolving phenomenon better as in the case 
of hyperinflations.  To our knowledge, this application of the back propagation algorithm 
in neural networks, in which the learning rate “switches” endogenously, appears for the 




15The introduction of neural network learning in the seigniorage model, as 
described below, helps us redress the following issues in hyperinflation episodes:  
1.  Is modeling learning important for understanding stabilizations? Can agents 
learn the rational expectations equilibrium over time, as indicated by Cagan (1991) and 
Bullard and Butler (1993)? 
2.  How does the convergence in neural network vs. least squares learning occur 
and at what values?  Gradient descent learning has been shown to converge under E-
stability correspondence (Evans and Honkapohja (1998) and Barucci and Landi (1997), 
what about the neural network learning variant?  As suggested by Chen and White 
(1998), is it preferable that we use other nonparametric techniques, i.e., PLM be specified 
non-parametrically? 
3.  What do we learn about the behavior of the model and does it indeed match the 
stylized facts of hyperinflations? 
 
6. A Model of Seigniorage and Learning  
6.1. The Economy 
  The underlying economic model is one of inflation with government financing the 
deficit by seigniorage.
14  We consider a basic overlapping generations (OLG) economy 
with fiat money, where agents are two-period lived.  Trade and consumption of a single 
perishable good take place in periods t ∈ {0,1,….}.  Every agent of generation t lives 
only over t and t+1 (young and old, respectively) and consumes in these periods c1t and 
                                                 
14 An extensive description of the model can be found in Ljunqvuist and Sargent (2001, Chapter 8), and 
Lettau and Van Zandt (2002), among others. Sargent (1993, p. 90-95) provides a stochastic version of the 
model. 
 
16c2t.  Each agent has a unique endowment (e1, e2), e1>e2, and the same utility function U(.).  
There is also a storable good, “money”, used in exchange that has no consumption value. 
The initial stock of money is m-1>0, supplied to the initial generation that lives only one 
period with endowment of e0.  In addition, we consider a government that finances the 
deficit through seigniorage only; this implies money does have value.  Let pt be the price 
of the perishable good at period t.  Let πt+1=pt+1/pt be the (gross) inflation rate in period 
t+1.  Young agents trade and form expectations about the price to prevail in the next 
period.  Given the current price and an expected future price, p
e
t+1, agents in generation t 
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    (5) 
We assume the problem has a unique solution and the constraints are binding in 
equilibrium.
15  The solution depends in an obvious way only on the expected inflation.  It 
is well known that the solution to this problem yields a Cagan-type demand (savings 
function) for real balances given by: 
12
e
t m 1 t γ γπ + =−      (6) 
where the γ’s are functions of the discount factor β in the utility function and 
endowments.  Let    12 0. γγ >>
  As mentioned above, money creation is only driven by the need to finance 
seigniorage.  The government augments the initial money stock in each period t in the 
following way (this is its budget constraint): 
                                                 
15  For further derivations of the results that follow, see the Appendices. 
 
171 / tt t hh d t π − = +      (7) 
where { }
0 t t d
∞
=  is an exogenous iid stochastic process and represents seigniorage, ht is the 
money supply.
16  Using the equilibrium condition in the money markets and equations (6) 
and (7), we readily obtain an equilibrium map for the economy: 
1 (, , ) 0
ee
tt t F ππ π + . =
17 
In particular, the equilibrium dynamics of the economy is described by the actual 
inflation as a function of expected inflation this (current) period and expected inflation in 
the following period.  Furthermore, given our particular choice of the utility function in 

















    (8) 
The rational expectations “dual” equilibria (REE) to this model are well known and thus 
the main results are relegated to Appendix 2.
18 
We augment this formulation of the model along the lines of Marcet and Nicolini 
(1998, p. 8), to capture the behavior of governments and economies experiencing 
hyperinflation (see Table 1).  Equation (8) describes the solution in periods of no 
exchange rate rules (or other similar rules that reduce governments’ incentives to collect 
seigniorage through money creation).  In periods of a “fixed exchange rate rule” (ERR), 
the government’s concern about the current levels of inflation prompts it to peg the 
                                                 
t
16 A more straightforward, intuitive way to express (7) is the following:  1 tt t mm p d − = + . 
17 Stationary solutions satisfy  (,,) 0 F π ππ = .  There are two stationary rational expectations solutions, 
as discussed in the introduction, (π
L,π
H), low and high inflation states. These are shown in Appendix 2. 
18 Detailed description of the behavior of these solutions when  , or very high, and there is no 
uncertainty introduced through assuming random seigniorage dt (or σd
2=0) exists in Sargent and Wallace 
(1981), Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Arifovic (1995). However, Proposition 3 in Marcet and Nicolini 
(2003) verifies the properties of the equilibrium map with these additional extensions. 
U β = ∞
 
18foreign exchange rate thorough foreign reserves operation in the market (some of these 
rules are easily instituted through a currency board, for example Argentina (1991) and 











=  where et is the 
exchange rate in terms of the foreign currency and p
f
t is the foreign price level.   











= =       ( 9 )  
To implement this policy, the government needs to know only the foreign price level and 
the exchange rate.  The government budget constraint will not hold under the new 
regime; it must be supplanted with the stock of foreign exchange reserves to 
acknowledge the adjustment the government makes to enforce ERR.
20  Since we do not 
intend to formally model reserves in this model, we impose a rule on how the government 
acts in times of increasing inflation. In a sense, they enforce the rule whenever inflation 









= ≤     ( 1 0 )  
where θ
U is the maximum “tolerated” inflation rate, after which ERR is imposed. 
Hence, the model can be expressed as: 
                                                 
1 ) , −
19 Some evidence of PPP in high inflation transition economies is provided in Christev and Noorbakhsh 
(2000). 
20 This implies as in Marcet and Nicolini (2003):  1 ( tt t t t t t HH d p e R R − = ++ − where Rt is the level 
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6.2. Adaptive Learning and Lower Bounds to Rationality 
  Assume a self-referential model of the type discussed in Marcet and Sargent 
(1988, 1989a,b) that satisfies:
21 
11 (, , , )
e
tt t t xH xxξ λ −+ =     (12) 
where H is determined by (6) and (7) and market equilibrium. xt is inflation and money 
supply, x
e
t+1 is agents’ expectations of the future value of xt and ξt is seigniorage.  λ 
contains a vector of parameters relating to the behavior of the public and government 
policy: γ1, γ2, 
U and θ θ . 
Agents form expectations in the following way: 
1 (() ,)
e
tt t x z θµ + = x      ( 1 3 )  
θt(µ) is estimated from past data, and z is the forecast function that depends on the state 
variable xt.  The θ s are governed by a learning rule f, where µ’s explicitly model how 
past data is to be used in estimation of the forecasts: 
1 () ( () ,,) . ttt f x θ µθ µ µ − =      ( 1 4 )  
                                                 
21 See also Evans and Honkapohja (1995) for additional description and stability results for this type of 
models. 
 
20Let us assume that for this model, z is  1
e
tt π θ + = .  Below, by imposing lower bounds to 
rationality of agents in the model, due to Marcet and Nicolini (2003), we relate and 
restrict the behavior of the above parameters via the learning rule, f. 
Adaptive learning places upper bounds on rationality by assuming agents do not 
know the exact economic model under which they operate and have bounded memory.  
There may be a variety of learning rules that meet these bounds, and as Sims (1980) has 
warned us, our models may simply slip into the “wilderness of irrationality” and not be 
falsifiable.  To avoid this dilemma, Marcet and Nicolini (2003) suggest that we allow for 
small departure (in transition and asymptotically) from rational expectations.  This is 
proposed so that, given an economic model and some empirical observations, we may 
introduce learning rules that satisfy certain lower bounds while at the same time confront 
the model with the observed behavior of the economy.  Much like Marcet and Nicolini 
(2003, p. 13 and 25), the simulations discussed in Section 9 provide evidence that the 
model may generate equilibria quite different from the rational expectations (RE) ones 
and match the data better. 
  Marcet and Nicolini (2003, p. 15-17) propose three lower bounds to rationality 
that we adopt in what follows and study two alternative learning rules.  Let 
,T ε π  be the 
probability that, in a sample of T periods, the perceived prediction errors will be within 














ε ( ) ) π ε ++ + +
==
⎡⎤ ≡− < − Ε ⎣⎦ ∑∑ +     (15) 
where Εt is the true conditional expectation under the learning rule and x’s are defined as 
above.  This definition implies that after T periods the prediction error from the agents in 
 
21the model is within ε of the true prediction error.  The convergence of this probability 
asymptotically limits the behavior of our learning rules and allows the weights (learning 
steps), with which agents in the model update their forecasts, to be determined 
endogenously in what follows.  The first bound to rationality in Marcet and Nicolini 
(2003) is as follows:
22 
Definition 1:  Asymptotic Rationality (AR): the learning rule satisfies asymptotic 
rationality in the model of Section 6.1 if:   
, 10
T as T for
ε πε →→ ∞ ∀ . >
This allows agents to make forecasting errors for some time in the future but not do it 
consistently forever. 
Definition 2:  Epsilon-Delta Rationality (EDR): the learning rule satisfies epsilon-delta 
rationality for (ε, T, δ) in the model of Section 6.1 if: 
, 1.
eT π δ ≥−  
Definition 2 requires that agents make optimal or near optimal forecasts within a given 
learning rule.  Denote  (, ) θ µµ ′    to be the forecast given by the learning parameter µ′ 
when in fact all agents in the model are using the parameter µ : 
1 (, ) ( (, ) , , ) , tt t fx
µ θ µµ θ µµ µ − ′ ′′ =     
where   is the learning rule under study.  f
Definition 3: Internal Consistency (IC):  Given the model in Section 6.1, the learning 





( ( (() , ) ) )m i n( ( ((, ) , ) ) ) ,
TT
tt t tt t
tt
xz x xz x
TT
µµ µ µ
µ θ µθ µ ++ ′
==
′ Ε− ≤ Ε− ∑∑   µ ε +
                                                
(16) 
 
22 As these authors acknowledge, they are not the first to impose these requirements in the literature on 
stability of RE under adaptive learning. See Kurtz (1994) and also Fudenburg and Levine (1995).  
 
22where z(.) is defined as the expectations of the agents in the model.  This requirement, in 
fact, helps us select an efficient learning parameter from a set of alternatives that 
identifies an equilibrium in the model given the learning rule used by the agents.  While it 
is not straightforward to show that Epsilon-Delta Rationality satisfies a given learning 
rule, it implies that learning forecasts might in effect be better at detecting a regime 
change and once in place the agents are not willing to change to a different learning 
mechanism within the model.
23  We only employ the IC criteria of Eq. (16) to select the 
learning step in the back-propagation algorithm and compare the results to the least 
squares learning as defined below. 
 
7. Learning Equilibria with Least Squares 
Now suppose, we depart from the rational expectations hypothesis used in the 
model above.  Instead, let us assume expectations are given by:  1 t
e
t π θ = + .  Under certain 
conditions, not all equilibria could be the outcomes of adaptive learning processes 
described in Section 6.2.  The learning rule could change adaptively in a way that the 
parameters are altered in response to forecast errors.  Agents form expectations of 
inflation in the next period as a weighted average of the previous inflation expectations 
and updates on the last prediction error.  One way to express this learning mechanism is: 
      11
1




−− =+ − 1 ) −
                                                
     ( 1 7 )  
 
23 See Marcet and Nicoli (2003, p.25-26) for a proof that ERD obtains when least squares learning is used 
by the agents under uncertainty.   
 
23given initial values θ0.  This is a well-known adaptive expectations formula, a particular 





 decreases over time at rate t.
24  The evolution of the learning step and 
(17) determine the learning mechanism f in (13). 
  The gain sequence is often expressed as: 
 
    (18)  1 1, tt αα − =+
 
with initial α1=1.  Thus, when   (commonly used assumption), the forecast rule is 
simply a regression of the mean of past inflations. 
t t α =
  Alternatively, when there is a structural change in the economy, and agents have 
to update their perceived inflation accordingly, the approach that appears more robust is 
to assume that αt is not decreasing infinitely but rather is equal to some fixed value α >1.  
This is called a “constant-gain” algorithm and is studied in Benveniste (et. al., 1990, ch.1 
and 4 part I).  Unlike (18), where new information is given proportionately less weight, 
the constant-gain step allows for abrupt changes in the economy to be followed more 
rapidly, allowing higher weights on the last available information.  The optimal choice 
will depend on the magnitude and frequency of the structural change.
25 
  Marcet and Nicolini (2003) propose to combine the two approaches, and have 
least squares updates with a decreasing gain to occur in periods of stability and “tracking” 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Evans and Honkapohja (1995) and Marcet and Sargent (1989a).  Lettau and Van Zandt 
(2002) study the stability of this learning rule for the same model of hyperinflation as in this paper. 
25 As shown in Ljung, Pflug and Walk (1992), there is a trade-off between bias and accuracy when a 
constant-gain algorithm is used but it is clearly preferred to detecting abrupt changes in the structure of the 
economy, evolving over time. These are called algorithms with “tracking.” 
 
24when sudden and abrupt change or instability is observed.
26  In this way, we allow the 
agents in the model to use an endogenous gain sequence in which agents use least squares 
when they do not make large mistakes and switch to fixed values of alpha when 
prediction errors increase above a certain threshold ν , say more than 10%, in cases of 




















     ( 1 9 )  
Hence, the model in (11) with least squares learning becomes: 
12 1 12 1
1
12 12
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Provided the learning mechanism in (17) and (19), Equation (20) is highly 
nonlinear and thus we describe its solution via simulations in Section 9 below.  Marcet 
and Nicolini (2003) study the stability properties of the mapping from PLM to ALM 
when seigniorages are stochastic (see Proposition 3 of their paper, p. 30).  This element 
of uncertainty determines the equilibrium path of the model.  They prove that the 
function is increasing and convex and possesses two stationary rational expectations 
equilibria (fixed points of the mapping T): low inflation rate and high inflation rate (see 
also Figures 5 and 6).  They also show convergence to the lower of the two stationary 
equilibria and that, for high enough seigniorage, no equilibrium exists.  Figure 6, in 
addition, illustrates that the stable set (S set) decreases as seigniorage increases.  A 
                                                 
26 This is indeed also suggested in Evans and Honkapohja (1993). 
 
25succession of high seigniorage shocks increases perceived inflation in the unstable set (U 
set) and the system tends to unravel in an ever-increasing inflation.  When inflation 
becomes intolerable, the government sets up a credible exchange rate rule (ERR) and 
agents switch to tracking as more recent events have become increasingly more 
important.  This sends inflation back into S set.  When the unstable U set is closer to the 
lower stable rational expectations equilibrium, hyperinflations become more likely since 
seigniorage is higher.  We will use this intuition of the model to explain some of the 
stylized facts discussed earlier. 
 
8. Learning Equilibria with Neural Networks 
  We introduce neural network expectations and learning in the model of Section 6.  
Thus, economic agents in this model will continually employ neural networks to learn 
and approximate their perceived (expectations of) inflation to the actual, true conditional 
expectations of the future inflation rate (Salmon, 1995).  This process of trial and error 
(as explained above and represented by the back-propagation algorithm), of adjusting to 
“reality” as new data become available, proceeds until a trade-off margin is reached and 
it is no longer optimal for agents to adjust.  In a sense, further accuracy is no longer 
necessary, given economic conditions (Salmon, 1995, p. 250).  As mentioned, this stems 
from the powerful approximation properties of the hidden layer neural networks (NN). 
(See White 1989, 1992 and Kosko 1992).  The measure of accuracy is the sum of the 
mean of squared prediction errors.  Back-propagation learning (BPL) converges to a set 
 
26of weights
27 (model parameters) that could provide locally (mean-square) optimal 
predictions of future expected inflation. (White (1989) and Kuan and White (1994, p.40 -
56) provide formal treatment). 
In this nonparametric sense, without specifying the structure of expectations 
formation, the back-propagation algorithm and the NN that defines it may indeed have 
the potential of learning the true rational expectations equilibrium of the model (Salmon, 
1995 and Heinemann, 2000).  These studies show that learning, even ‘approximate,’ 
rational expectations equilibria, is not straightforward.  The recursive, iterative nature of 
the algorithm used corresponds closely to adaptive learning mechanisms of Section 6.2, 
and mimics “the solution to forward-looking rational expectations.” (Salmon 1995, p. 
267)  In addition, providing asymptotic convergence results for NN estimates, Kuan and 
White (1994, p.40-41, Theorem II.2.1) show that the solution trajectory of the back-
propagation algorithm does not cycle between two stable equilibria.  In what follows we 
examine whether (and if not, why not) the time varying, nonlinear inflation process 
implies a θ  that converges and compare the results in quantitative sense to the least 
squares learning algorithm.  It is of interest to understand how and under what set of 
initial conditions and parameter values the behavior of the system changes and evolves 
over time.  Again, the goal is to explain some of the stylized facts of hyperinflations and 
contrast the results under different learning rules.  In the process, the small departure, 
defined in the precise sense of Definition 3, away from rational expectations, is under 
scrutiny. 
                                                 
27 These are the model parameters that we estimate through a back-propagation algorithm and represent 
future expected inflation.  That is, they provide an approximation to the function (mapping) relating 
perceived to actual inflation in the model, i.e., the law of motion in the economy. 
 
27We construct a single hidden layer NN with two inputs: a constant and the current 
inflation rate.  Let NN expectation of future inflation be: 
1 (,, t a n )
e
tt t Fc o n s ππ δ + = t      ( 2 1 )  
Using the model equations (5) and (6), we obtain the current inflation generation process: 
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  (22) 
where θ , 
U θ  and   are defined as before.  The network expectation function   
defined in Eq. (23) is obtained in the process described above.  The inputs (inflation this 
period and a bias) are sent to intermediate (hidden) unit, which is activated through the 
sigmoid function, and sent forward to the output level.  The hidden layer (indexed by 
j=1…q) yields an activation function  , where G is the sigmoid 
function and i=1…T.  The network output can be expressed as: 
t d (,) g πδ
1 ( ij i j i j aG a πλ µ − ′′ =+ )
0 (,) ( , ) ,
q
tt i j j
j
gF a πδ π δ β β
=
== + ∑     ( 2 3 )  
where    These are the weights, or connection strengths, 
and the parameters to be learned through a recursive back-propagation learning 
algorithm.  The agents are estimating their updates of future expected inflation in a loop 
that allows them to target the previous period iteration’s value as an approximation they 
learn based on current and past inflation rates.  The learning rule in the model is: 
01 (,, qq q q δββ λ λ µµ ′′ ′′ = ……… ) . ′
11
1
ˆ (( , tt t t t
t
FF δ δδ π π δ
α
−− =+ ∇−) ) ,      ( 2 4 )  




















     ( 2 5 )  
The advantages of using this algorithm in the model are twofold.  First, multiple passes 
through the data allow for reaching a global optimum.  In addition, the algorithm 
represents a simple updating estimation procedure to solving complex models of 
unknown functions without much prior knowledge of the particular relationship among 
the variables involved.  If the estimation converges, we expect it to converge to 
approximate rational expectations equilibria, thereby minimizing the mean square 
prediction error (Heinemann, 2000).  However, apart from misspecification, problems 
may arise related to the feedback feature of the algorithm, and may prevent convergence.  
In addition, there is a dearth of analytic results for general nonlinear economic models 
using NN to approximate expectations.  In simulations below, we show the behavior of 
the system regarding convergence to rational expectations solutions. 
 
9. Model Solutions by Simulation: Comparing Different Learning Equilibria 
IC criteria of Eq. (16) in Definition 3 is what we use to define equilibria in the 
model with both learning rules; thus the variables we determine provide sequences of 
current inflation, expected (perceived) inflation and the parameter α .  Hence, these 
sequences should satisfy (20 and 22), (17 and 24) and (19 and 25) for all periods, given 
α α , and   should satisfy (16) for (ε, T) appropriately chosen.  We numerically search for 
those alphas that fulfill IC and are efficient in the sense that they impose restrictions on 
 
29the behavior of agents.  First, we select 
1
α
 over the grid [0,1.1].  The interval is discrete 
with a length of 0.1.  We use the same values for the alternative learning parameter 




.  We next compute the left-hand side of Equation (16) 
by Monte Carlo integration.  We draw one thousand realizations of the random 
seigniorage   for t=1…T.  In the model, we find equilibrium inflation rates for each of 





.  We then calculate the mean square error for each of these alternative 
forecasts and average them over all realizations. 




) for each column (
1
α
).  Those values over the grid that form a mean square 
error (MSE) within ε  = 0.01 of the minimum in each column and lie on the diagonal of 
Table 4 are called the efficient values of the learning parameter α .
28  This is what is 
required in Equation (16).  This implies that agents using an efficient value of alpha have 
little incentive to change their learning parameter given the choice of other agents with 
the same learning rule. 
To simulate the model, we need to choose values for the parameters in the money 
demand function (6) and the distribution of dt.  We model the seigniorage as a truncated, 
normally distributed, variable with different means and standard deviation of 0.01.  Since 
some evidence exists to support a Laffer curve in the experiences we study, we note that 
                                                 
28 In this exercise, we closely followed the one done in Marcet and Nicolini (2003).  However, for the 
neural network learning in this paper, we report Monte Carlo MSEs for only one high level of seigniorage 
since it is more computationally intensive.  Numerous other runs were performed with different levels of 
seigniorage but only with 250 draws of the random variable. 
 
30the money demand function in the OLG model implies a stationary Laffer curve.
29  
However, unlike Marcet and Nicolini (2003), who primarily want to explain the 
Argentine experience and used only one set of parameters, we use an interval of inflation 
rates that maximize seigniorage and a measure of maximum revenue from seigniorage to 
construct a number of different parameter values to use in the simulations.  Inflation 
varied between 20 and 60 percent and the revenue from 5 to 40 percent.  Simulations of 
the model with learning through least squares and neural networks were performed with 
eight different sets of parameter values.  Table 3 presents those and gives the stationary 




REE2) associated with these model 
economies.  
We start with the parameter values used in Marcet and Sargent (1989b).  The 
results are presented in Set 2 of Table 3.  Both least squares and neural network learning 
failed to converge to the lower stationary inflation rate in this instance.  This may be due 
to the difference in initial beliefs (though starting values in each case are given fairly 
close to π
*
REE1) or different convergence of the algorithms at values of seigniorage close 
to the maximum sustainable levels under rational expectations.  Parameter Set 4 (used in 
Marcet and Nicolini) points to an interesting result: the relevance of the average level of 
seigniorage for the stability of (hyper) inflationary processes.  While at the lower levels 
of average seigniorage (0.045) the inflation rate tends to stabilize around the lower 
rational expectations equilibrium value, at higher seigniorage levels (0.049) no 
convergence occurs using both learning rules.  Increased average seigniorage leads to 
                                                 
29 See Fisher, et. al. (2002).  Azariadis (1993, p. 397) provides the formula for a stationary Laffer curve one 
may use to compute the range of parameters in the model.  See also Kiguel and Neumeyer (1992) and 
Miller and Zhang (1997).  The latter authors provide the range of parameters they used in their analysis of 
the Ukrainian hyperinflation. 
 
31higher and unsustainable inflation.  What is surprising, however, is that, under different 
values of the parameters (Sets 1, 3, 5-8), both least squares and neural network learning 
algorithms behave strikingly similarly.  Inflation converges to the lower rational 
expectations equilibrium.  This result suggests that, given certain conditions, the agents in 
our model are able to learn the rational expectations outcome through either of the two 
alternative learning mechanisms. 
Hence, simulations of the seigniorage model with a wide range of parameters 
implies that there may exist a correspondence between the stability (E-stability) 
conditions for the convergence of the NN learning and the least squares learning.   
However, this finding is in contrast to Salmon (1995), who suggests that the domain of 
attraction of equilibria is much higher and wider for neural networks than least squares 
regressions.  Furthermore, Heinemann (2000, p. 2009) claims that neural network 
learning may give rise to expectations that do not minimize the mean square prediction 
error.  Certainly, our results do not indicate that this is the case.  Since in the form used 
here,
30 NN learning is similar to a stochastic gradient algorithm, it is worth pointing out 
that Barucci and Landi (1997) prove convergence to REE under conditions that turn out 
to be quite different than the ones generally established for least squares learning.  Their 
results, however, depend crucially on assuming a decreasing learning step  t η .  We, on the 
other hand, adopt a modified version of the back propagation learning to account for a 
sudden regime shift that effectively stop hyperinflations.  In this way, by choosing an 
optimal  t η  within a given learning rule, we not only provide justification for rational 
expectations equilibria as illustrated, but also show that learning introduces dynamics that 
                                                 
30 Sometimes also referred to as the generalized delta rule.  
 
32are important and significant in their own right and track evolving expectations better 
than the rational expectation version of the model. 
Figures 7-9 plot the results of simulations for Sets 6 and 8 and a particular, 
efficient value of 
1
α
=0.2.  It is clear that the model under learning creates much higher 
rates of inflation (hyperinflation) than the stationary rational expectations version.  It also 
captures the sudden and abrupt stabilizations that occurred in most hyperinflations and 
exemplifies the importance of inflationary expectations in the process.  Since sustained 
increases in inflation appear to be generated by normally distributed (iid) random  , 
there is little contemporaneous correlation between inflation and seigniorage.   
Introducing ERR, for example, successfully stabilizes inflation, returning it back to the 
stable S set around the low REE, for a time, but unless levels of seigniorage are reduced 
permanently, the system may be cast back into the unstable U set as a result of a large 
shock and another hyperinflation occurs (see Fig. 9-10).  These figures clearly display 





The findings of this analysis are threefold.  First, in the seigniorage model of 
hyperinflation with learning dynamics, the REE are learnable.  Second, results from 
simulations suggest that, for a certain range of parameters, the behavior of the neural 
network learning with endogenously changing learning step is very similar to the one 
often exhibited by least squares learning.  Third, the stylized facts of hyperinflationary 
 
33episodes seem to be better explained with the introduction of learning dynamics than 
using only the rational expectations version of the model. 
In addition, one may augment the model presented here and study the situation in 
which we replace the assumption of real government spending with nominal money 
growth rule, thus make government endogenous so that the government budget constraint 
is satisfied.  In this case, introducing the type of learning described here may result in 
different equilibria.  
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39Seigniorage Inflation
Bulgaria: Quarterly Seigniorage vs Inflation
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Ukraine: Quarterly Seigniorage vs Inflation








































Figure 2: Ukraine in the 1990s and Austria in the 1920s 
SW (1973) stands for seigniorage series found in Sargent and Wallace (1973, Table 6).  This 











(left axis) and ∆M/P as seigniorage (right axis). 
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TABLE 2. CLASSIFICATION OF STABILIZATION PROGRAMS 
 Orthodox  Heterodox 





























  First, note that if a stationary rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) exists, 
then ERR is never established.  Assuming  1 t 1
e








 to rule out zero or negative real money balances, we can solve 
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. 
As discussed in the introduction and shown in both Sargent and Wallace (1981) and 
Marcet and Sargent (1989), the high stationary REE is stable and this implies that raising 
the seigniorage level causes the low REE to increase and high RRE decrease (see Fig. 3 
and 4 below in Appendix 3).  Note that when d=0, there is no inflation at the lower SREE 







.  Marcet and Nicolini (2003) show in addition that these 
SRRE are outside the interval or close to the rational expectation solutions of the model 





Figure 3: Equilibrium Dynamics of Inflation with steady state rational expectations solutions: 






















TABLE 3: SET OF PARAMETERS FOR SIMULATIONS: OLG ECONOMIES WITH VARIABLE 
REAL DEFICIT FINANCED THROUGH SEIGNIORAGE 
Parameters  1 2 3 4 
γ1  5 1  100  0.37 
γ2  2 0.9  50  0.148 
d   0.01 0.0019 0.05  0.045 
π
*
REE1  1.0033 1.026  1.001  1.37 
π
*
REE2  2.4917 1.0838  1.998  1.829 
π
LS  1.003  1.4189
*  1.0010 1.3757 
π
NN  1.003  1.4042
*  1.0010 1.4134 
     
γ1  5 1  100  0.37 
γ2  2 0.9  50  0.148 
d   0.5 0.0024  0.075  0.049 
π
*
REE1  1.25 1.0377  1.0015 1.48 
π
*
REE2  2.00 1.0707  1.997  1.69 
π
LS  1.249  1.3566
*  1.0015  1.984
* 
π
NN  1.250  1.3863
*  1.0015  1.855
* 
Parameters  5 6 7 8 
γ1  2.81 0.898  3.144 0.71 
γ2  1.67 0.399  1.396 0.28 
d   0.06 0.095 0.01 0.045 
π
*
REE1  1.06 1.37  1.0058  1.1289 
π
*
REE2  1.59 1.64  2.239  2.246 
π
LS  1.0618  1.3652 1.007 1.1321 
π
NN  1.0695 1.375 1.0107  1.1292 
     
γ1  2.81 0.898  3.144 0.71 
γ2  1.67 0.399  1.396 0.28 
d   0.145 0.098 0.349 0.097 
π
*
REE1  1.25 1.42 1.47 1.51 
π
*
REE2  1.34 1.586 1.53 1.679 
π
LS  1.2387 1.416 1.4070  1.52 
π
NN  1.3874
*  1.4224 1.445 1.5090 





TABLE 4: EFFICIENT VALUES OF 
1
α
 IN EQUATION (11): MONTE CARLO MEAN SQUARE 
ERRORS (MSE) -  1 γ =0.898 AND  2 γ =0.399  
LEAST SQUARES LEARNING: AVERAGE SEIGNIORAGE= 0.098 
  0  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 
1.1  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.05 1.88 20.16  17.26 6.85 4.58 2.29 9.15 
1.0  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 1.73 18.26  15.69 6.30 4.20 2.11 8.24 
0.9  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 1.60 16.68  14.31 5.85 3.89 1.95 7.46 
0.8  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 1.49 15.35  13.11 5.47 3.62 1.81 6.80 
0.7  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.05 1.40 14.24  12.06 5.14 3.38 1.68 6.21 
0.6  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.05 1.31 13.30  11.13 4.82 3.15 1.54 5.71 
0.5  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.04 1.24 12.47  10.31 4.50 2.94 1.41 5.25 
0.4  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 1.17 11.73 9.58 4.17 2.73 1.30 4.84 
0.3  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 1.10 11.04 8.93 3.84 2.54 1.19 4.47 
0.2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05 0.04 1.03 10.36 8.35 3.51 2.35 1.10 4.14 
0.1 0.00  0.00  0.01 0.04 0.03 0.94 9.69 7.86 3.20 2.16 1.02 3.85 
0  0.00  0.15 0.33 0.20 0.59 1.40 3.41 4.68 3.64 4.37 2.60 7.51 
Note: Rows represent the alternative values for 
1
α′
; columns give the possible values for 
1
α
 used in the 






NEURAL NETWORK (BACK-PROPAGATION) LEARNING: AVERAGE SEIGNIORAGE= 0.098 
 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 
1.1  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.57 1.49 5.03  15.70  6.32  21.83  4.97 
1.0  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.51 1.34 4.43  14.09  5.70  19.56  4.29 
0.9  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.48 1.21 4.02  12.77  5.21  17.69  3.76 
0.8  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.46 1.12 3.66  11.70  4.79  16.15  3.33 
0.7  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.43 1.04 3.66  11.68  4.44  14.83  3.28 
0.6  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.39 0.98 3.32  11.58  4.34  15.92  2.67 
0.5  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.37 0.92 3.25  10.33  4.24  14.08  2.55 
0.4  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.35 0.87 2.85 9.19 3.78  12.41  2.43 
0.3  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.08 0.34 0.82 2.66 8.62 3.44  11.28  2.08 
0.2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 0.07 0.31 0.77 2.47 7.83 3.26  10.67  1.97 
0.1 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.01 0.07 0.28 0.70 2.32 7.36 3.00  10.02  1.82 
0.0  0.01 0.06 0.31 1.10 2.21 1.54 2.02 1.63 6.53 2.48 7.32 4.27 
Note: Rows represent the alternative values for 
1
α′
; columns give the possible values for 
1
α
 used in the 












+ .  OLG economy set 6 of Parameters in Table 1 with average 




= – least squares learning 
 





















+ .  OLG economy set 8 of Parameters in Table 1 with average 




= – least squares learning 
 
 






+ .  OLG economy set 8 of Parameters in Table 1 with average 




= – neural network learning 
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